{ "generated": "2026-11-09", "licence": "CC BY 4.0", "jurisdictions": { "au": { "id": "au", "name": "Commonwealth of Australia", "type": "federal", "summary": "The federal tier. Rarely the direct approver for building or small business, but sets environment, tax, migration, communications and workplace obligations that sit alongside state processes.", "website": "https://www.australia.gov.au", "data_portal": "https://data.gov.au", "notes": "The Commonwealth is where Australian open data is strongest, and where the gap\nbetween \"published\" and \"usable\" is easiest to demonstrate. AusTender, the\nTransparency Portal and the ABS release genuinely good material.\n\nThat makes it the right place to start, for an unobvious reason: the federal\ntier is the control group. When a question cannot be answered at council level,\nthe standard reply is that small councils lack the resources. Showing that the\nsame question is answerable federally, from data collected for much the same\npurpose, turns a resourcing excuse into a design question.\n" }, "brisbane": { "id": "brisbane", "name": "Brisbane City Council", "type": "council", "parent": "qld", "population": 1290000, "summary": "Australia's largest local government by population, and the assessment manager for most development in Brisbane.", "website": "https://www.brisbane.qld.gov.au", "data_portal": "https://www.data.brisbane.qld.gov.au", "notes": "Brisbane is the largest council in the country and publishes more than most.\nThat makes it the fairest possible test case: if a question cannot be answered\nabout Brisbane, it almost certainly cannot be answered about a council with a\ntenth of the staff.\n\nEvery gap recorded here should be read that way. It is a floor, not an\nindictment of one council.\n" }, "nsw": { "id": "nsw", "name": "New South Wales", "type": "state", "parent": "au", "population": 8339000, "summary": "Development assessment is governed by the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, with a fast-track complying development pathway assessed by council or a registered private certifier.", "website": "https://www.nsw.gov.au", "data_portal": "https://data.nsw.gov.au", "notes": "NSW runs its access-to-information regime under the GIPA Act, which is built\naround a positive duty to publish rather than merely a right to request. That\nframing is unusually useful for this register: where a body holds information it\nis required to make openly available and does not, the gap is a compliance\nquestion rather than a matter of preference.\n" }, "qld": { "id": "qld", "name": "Queensland", "type": "state", "parent": "au", "population": 5560000, "summary": "Development assessment runs under the Planning Act 2016 and its statutory Development Assessment Rules; building work is certified under the Building Act 1975, commonly by private building certifiers.", "website": "https://www.qld.gov.au", "data_portal": "https://www.data.qld.gov.au", "notes": "Queensland's Right to Information Act follows a push model: agencies are\nexpected to release information administratively rather than wait to be asked.\nTesting how far that holds in practice at council level is one of the more\nuseful things this register can do.\n" }, "sydney": { "id": "sydney", "name": "City of Sydney", "type": "council", "parent": "nsw", "population": 217000, "summary": "Local government area covering the Sydney CBD and surrounds; consent authority for most development within its boundaries.", "website": "https://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au", "notes": "Included as a second metropolitan council so that any finding about Brisbane can\nbe checked against a comparable body operating under a different state regime.\n" }, "vic": { "id": "vic", "name": "Victoria", "type": "state", "parent": "au", "population": 6959000, "summary": "Planning permits are issued by councils under the Planning and Environment Act 1987; building permits are separate and generally issued by private or municipal building surveyors.", "website": "https://www.vic.gov.au", "data_portal": "https://discover.data.vic.gov.au", "notes": "Victoria is included primarily for comparison. Where three states collect\nsubstantially the same information under different statutes and publish it in\nthree incompatible shapes, the inconsistency itself becomes the finding.\n" } }, "publishers": { "abs": { "id": "abs", "name": "Australian Bureau of Statistics", "abbr": "ABS", "jurisdiction": "au", "role": "National statistical agency", "summary": "Australia's statistical agency; the Census and the geographic standard almost every other dataset is joined against.", "website": "https://www.abs.gov.au", "responsibilities": [ "Census of Population and Housing", "Australian Statistical Geography Standard", "Economic and labour force statistics" ], "notes": "The ABS matters here for a structural reason as much as for its data: the\nAustralian Statistical Geography Standard is the common spine that makes any\ncross-body comparison possible at all.\n\nWhere a dataset is published against ASGS areas it can be joined to everything\nelse. Where it is published against a body's own internal regions -- council\nwards, service districts, health areas -- it usually cannot, and that single\nchoice is responsible for a large share of the `fragmented` and `inconsistent`\nblockers in this register.\n" }, "aec": { "id": "aec", "name": "Australian Electoral Commission", "abbr": "AEC", "jurisdiction": "au", "role": "Elections and political finance disclosure", "summary": "Runs federal elections and publishes the annual political donation and expenditure disclosure returns.", "website": "https://www.aec.gov.au", "data_portal": "https://transparency.aec.gov.au" }, "bcc": { "id": "bcc", "name": "Brisbane City Council", "abbr": "BCC", "jurisdiction": "brisbane", "role": "Local government", "summary": "The largest local government in Australia by population, and one of the few councils operating a genuine open data portal.", "website": "https://www.brisbane.qld.gov.au", "data_portal": "https://www.data.brisbane.qld.gov.au", "responsibilities": [ "Development assessment records", "Rates, budget and annual financial statements", "Waste, roads, parks and local infrastructure" ], "notes": "Brisbane publishes more than most Australian councils, which is exactly why it\nis the right council to examine first. Findings about a well-resourced publisher\ngeneralise downwards; findings about a struggling one do not generalise at all.\n" }, "cer": { "id": "cer", "name": "Clean Energy Regulator", "abbr": "CER", "jurisdiction": "au", "role": "Administers Commonwealth climate and renewable energy schemes", "summary": "Runs the Safeguard Mechanism, the ACCU scheme and the small-scale renewable energy scheme, and publishes facility-level and postcode-level data on all three.", "website": "https://cer.gov.au", "responsibilities": [ "Safeguard Mechanism baselines and emissions reporting", "Australian Carbon Credit Unit scheme", "Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme", "National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting" ], "notes": "The best-performing publisher assessed in this register so far, and the finding\nwas a surprise: several entries here began as complaints about the CER before a\ncheck against its data page showed the material was already published, in CSV,\nat facility and postcode level.\n\nTwo things make it work. Its reporting obligations are set in legislation rather\nthan left to discretion, so publication does not depend on whether a given year's\nnumbers are flattering. And it publishes at the unit of the thing being regulated\n-- a facility, a postcode -- rather than rolling up to a national figure.\n\nWorth holding as the benchmark when assessing any other regulator.\n" }, "cityofsydney": { "id": "cityofsydney", "name": "City of Sydney", "jurisdiction": "sydney", "role": "Local government", "summary": "Inner Sydney council; publishes an open data portal and detailed committee papers.", "website": "https://www.cityofsydney.nsw.gov.au" }, "finance": { "id": "finance", "name": "Department of Finance", "abbr": "Finance", "jurisdiction": "au", "role": "Procurement, AusTender, annual reporting", "summary": "Operates AusTender and the Transparency Portal, which between them hold most of what is publicly known about federal contracting and agency performance.", "website": "https://www.finance.gov.au", "data_portal": "https://www.tenders.gov.au", "responsibilities": [ "AusTender: notices, contract notices and standing offers", "Transparency Portal: Commonwealth entity annual reports", "Commonwealth Procurement Rules" ], "notes": "Finance is the most important publisher in this register, because contract\nnotices are the one area where Australia genuinely does publish granular,\nmachine-readable, timely data as a matter of course.\n\nThat makes it the benchmark. Any argument that a body cannot publish\ntransaction-level spending has to explain why AusTender manages it across\nthousands of federal contracts a year.\n" }, "health": { "id": "health", "name": "Department of Health, Disability and Ageing", "abbr": "Health", "jurisdiction": "au", "role": "Commonwealth health, aged care and disability portfolio", "summary": "Administers Medicare, residential aged care regulation and the NDIS, and publishes program evaluations, aged care star ratings and care minutes data.", "website": "https://www.health.gov.au", "responsibilities": [ "Medicare Benefits Schedule and bulk billing incentives", "Medicare Urgent Care Clinics", "Residential aged care star ratings and care minutes" ] }, "housingaustralia": { "id": "housingaustralia", "name": "Housing Australia", "abbr": "Housing Australia", "jurisdiction": "au", "role": "Commonwealth housing finance and guarantee body", "summary": "Administers the Housing Australia Future Fund Facility, the National Housing Accord Facility and the government's deposit guarantee schemes.", "website": "https://www.housingaustralia.gov.au", "notes": "A mixed record, and the register holds both halves. Its Investment Mandate\nrequires publication of each financing decision within six months and it complies,\nand its Home Guarantee Scheme trends reporting voluntarily publishes the scheme's\nown default rate.\n\nAgainst that, completions under the Future Fund are not reported per project or\nper program, which the Auditor-General has recommended be fixed. See\n[[haff-homes-delivered]].\n" }, "nhsac": { "id": "nhsac", "name": "National Housing Supply and Affordability Council", "abbr": "NHSAC", "jurisdiction": "au", "role": "Independent advisory council on housing supply", "summary": "Advises government on housing supply and affordability, and reports quarterly on progress against the National Housing Accord target.", "website": "https://nhsac.gov.au", "notes": "Included because of what it publishes rather than how. NHSAC reports, quarter\nafter quarter, that the government is behind its own 1.2 million homes target,\nand states the forecast slip plainly rather than in the conditional.\n\nAn independent body publishing the shortfall against a headline commitment is the\nclearest institutional answer to the objection that inconvenient reporting cannot\nbe expected of government.\n" }, "oaic": { "id": "oaic", "name": "Office of the Australian Information Commissioner", "abbr": "OAIC", "jurisdiction": "au", "role": "FOI and privacy regulator", "summary": "Regulates the federal FOI regime, handles review of refused requests, and publishes statistics on FOI activity across Commonwealth agencies.", "website": "https://www.oaic.gov.au" }, "pc": { "id": "pc", "name": "Productivity Commission", "abbr": "PC", "jurisdiction": "au", "role": "Independent research and advisory body", "summary": "Conducts commissioned reviews and maintains the Closing the Gap Information Repository and the Report on Government Services.", "website": "https://www.pc.gov.au", "responsibilities": [ "Closing the Gap Information Repository and dashboard", "Report on Government Services", "Commissioned public inquiries and reviews" ] }, "treasury": { "id": "treasury", "name": "Department of the Treasury", "abbr": "Treasury", "jurisdiction": "au", "role": "Commonwealth economic policy department; administers federal financial relations", "summary": "Runs federal financial relations with the states, administers the housing agreements and funds, and publishes the intergovernmental agreements and the acquittals made under them.", "website": "https://treasury.gov.au", "responsibilities": [ "Federal financial relations and national agreements", "National Agreement on Social Housing and Homelessness", "Social Housing Accelerator", "Housing Australia Future Fund policy" ], "notes": "A mixed record, and the register holds both halves.\n\nTreasury publishes the intergovernmental material well: agreements, bilateral\nschedules, and every jurisdiction's signed acquittal under both the Social\nHousing Accelerator and the National Agreement on Social Housing and\nHomelessness. Two entries in this register began as accusations that those\ndocuments were withheld, and both were wrong.\n\nAgainst that, the Auditor-General found in 2026 that Treasury reports the\nCommonwealth's own housing programs -- the Future Fund, the Accord Facility and\nthe Accelerator -- only in aggregate, and does not report separately on the\nperformance of the individual programs. See [[haff-homes-delivered]].\n\nThe pattern is worth naming: Treasury publishes what the states owe it, and\naggregates what it owes the public.\n" } }, "regimes": { "foi-cth": { "id": "foi-cth", "name": "Commonwealth FOI", "jurisdiction": "au", "act": "Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)", "regulator": "Office of the Australian Information Commissioner", "fee": "No application fee; processing charges may apply", "response_days": 30, "internal_review": "Available on application to the agency", "external_review": "Information Commissioner review, then the Administrative Review Tribunal", "summary": "The federal regime. Broad right of access to documents held by Commonwealth agencies and ministers, subject to exemptions.", "notes": "The statutory period is a starting point rather than a description of\nexperience. It can be extended by agreement, for third-party consultation, and\nfor complex requests, and time spent waiting on a charges notice does not count\nagainst it.\n\nThat gap between the legislated clock and the elapsed clock is exactly the\ndistinction the sister project [[australianredtape|Australian Red Tape]] makes\nfor approval processes, and it applies here with equal force. A regime that\nanswers in thirty statutory days but nine elapsed months is not a\nthirty-day regime.\n", "sources": [ "Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth)" ] }, "foi-vic": { "id": "foi-vic", "name": "Victorian FOI", "jurisdiction": "vic", "act": "Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic)", "regulator": "Office of the Victorian Information Commissioner", "fee": "Application fee applies; access charges may apply", "response_days": 30, "internal_review": "Limited; review generally to the Information Commissioner", "external_review": "Information Commissioner review, then VCAT", "summary": "The Victorian regime, administered by OVIC.", "sources": [ "Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Vic)" ] }, "gipa-nsw": { "id": "gipa-nsw", "name": "NSW GIPA", "jurisdiction": "nsw", "act": "Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW)", "regulator": "Information and Privacy Commission NSW", "fee": "Application fee applies; processing charges beyond an initial period", "response_days": 20, "internal_review": "Available on application to the agency", "external_review": "Information Commissioner review, then NCAT", "summary": "The NSW regime, structured around four ways information is released: mandatory, proactive, informal, and by formal access application.", "notes": "GIPA is unusual and worth understanding properly, because it does not treat\naccess as beginning with a request. It imposes a positive duty to make certain\ninformation publicly available, and encourages proactive and informal release\nbefore a formal application is ever needed.\n\nFor this register that changes the character of a gap. Where a NSW body holds\ninformation falling within the open access requirements and has not published\nit, the entry is not merely recording that nobody has asked -- it is recording a\nfailure to do something the Act requires. Those are the strongest entries in the\nregister and are worth marking clearly.\n\nNote the response period is counted in working days, which is a materially\ndifferent thing from the Commonwealth's calendar days. Comparing the two\nregimes without adjusting for that is a common and misleading error.\n", "sources": [ "Government Information (Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW)" ] }, "rti-qld": { "id": "rti-qld", "name": "Queensland RTI", "jurisdiction": "qld", "act": "Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld)", "regulator": "Office of the Information Commissioner Queensland", "fee": "Application fee applies; processing charges may apply", "response_days": 25, "internal_review": "Available on application to the agency", "external_review": "Information Commissioner review, then QCAT", "summary": "Queensland's push-model regime: agencies are expected to release information administratively, with formal application as a last resort.", "notes": "The push model is the interesting feature. In principle a formal RTI application\nshould be unnecessary for most information, because agencies are expected to\nrelease administratively on request.\n\nWhether that holds in practice, particularly at council level, is an empirical\nquestion this register is well placed to answer: every question here recorded as\n`foi` for a Queensland body is a case where the push model did not push.\n\nCounted in business days.\n", "sources": [ "Right to Information Act 2009 (Qld)" ] } }, "scores": { "abs": { "count": 1, "mean": 100, "median": 100, "open": 1, "machine": 1, "api": 1, "unchecked": 1, "breakdown": { "open": 1 } }, "aec": { "count": 1, "mean": 90, "median": 90, "open": 1, "machine": 1, "api": 0, "unchecked": 1, "breakdown": { "open": 1 } }, "bcc": { "count": 4, "mean": 47, "median": 49, "open": 1, "machine": 1, "api": 0, "unchecked": 3, "breakdown": { "open": 1, "published": 2, "unpublished": 1 } }, "cer": { "count": 2, "mean": 90, "median": 90, "open": 2, "machine": 2, "api": 0, "unchecked": 2, "breakdown": { "open": 2 } }, "cityofsydney": { "count": 0, "mean": 0, "median": 0, "open": 0, "machine": 0, "api": 0, "unchecked": 0, "breakdown": {} }, "finance": { "count": 2, "mean": 70, "median": 69, "open": 1, "machine": 1, "api": 0, "unchecked": 2, "breakdown": { "open": 1, "published": 1 } }, "health": { "count": 1, "mean": 49, "median": 49, "open": 0, "machine": 0, "api": 0, "unchecked": 0, "breakdown": { "published": 1 } }, "housingaustralia": { "count": 1, "mean": 49, "median": 49, "open": 0, "machine": 0, "api": 0, "unchecked": 0, "breakdown": { "published": 1 } }, "nhsac": { "count": 1, "mean": 49, "median": 49, "open": 0, "machine": 0, "api": 0, "unchecked": 0, "breakdown": { "published": 1 } }, "oaic": { "count": 1, "mean": 69, "median": 69, "open": 0, "machine": 1, "api": 0, "unchecked": 1, "breakdown": { "published": 1 } }, "pc": { "count": 1, "mean": 90, "median": 90, "open": 1, "machine": 1, "api": 0, "unchecked": 0, "breakdown": { "open": 1 } }, "treasury": { "count": 1, "mean": 49, "median": 49, "open": 0, "machine": 0, "api": 0, "unchecked": 0, "breakdown": { "published": 1 } } }, "datasets": { "abs-census": { "title": "Census of Population and Housing", "publisher": "abs", "availability": "open", "summary": "The national census, released as tables and DataPacks down to small statistical areas.", "url": "https://www.abs.gov.au/census", "format": "csv", "licence": "", "open_licence": true, "machine_readable": true, "api": true, "granularity": "Statistical Area Level 1 and above", "update_frequency": "Every five years", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "", "cost": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "Census and Statistics Act 1905 (Cth)" ], "score": 100 }, "aec-disclosures": { "title": "Political donation and expenditure disclosure returns", "publisher": "aec", "availability": "open", "summary": "Annual returns lodged by parties, donors, associated entities and third parties under the federal disclosure scheme.", "url": "https://transparency.aec.gov.au", "format": "csv", "licence": "", "open_licence": true, "machine_readable": true, "api": false, "granularity": "Individual return", "update_frequency": "Annual", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "", "cost": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 (Cth), Part XX" ], "score": 90 }, "austender-contracts": { "title": "AusTender contract notices", "publisher": "finance", "availability": "open", "summary": "Notices of Commonwealth contracts above the reporting threshold, including supplier, value, agency, dates and procurement method.", "url": "https://www.tenders.gov.au", "format": "csv", "licence": "", "open_licence": true, "machine_readable": true, "api": false, "granularity": "Individual contract notice", "update_frequency": "Continuous", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "", "cost": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "Commonwealth Procurement Rules; AusTender published reporting" ], "score": 90 }, "bcc-annual-report": { "title": "Brisbane City Council annual report and financial statements", "publisher": "bcc", "availability": "published", "summary": "Audited financial statements and annual report, published as PDF.", "url": "https://www.brisbane.qld.gov.au", "format": "pdf", "licence": "", "open_licence": false, "machine_readable": false, "api": false, "granularity": "Whole-of-council, annual", "update_frequency": "Annual", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "2026-09-02", "cost": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "Local Government Act 2009 (Qld) reporting obligations" ], "score": 49 }, "bcc-open-data": { "title": "Brisbane City Council open data portal", "publisher": "bcc", "availability": "open", "summary": "Council datasets covering waste, parks, transport, planning overlays and more.", "url": "https://www.data.brisbane.qld.gov.au", "format": "mixed", "licence": "", "open_licence": true, "machine_readable": true, "api": false, "granularity": "Varies by dataset", "update_frequency": "Varies", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "", "cost": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "Brisbane City Council open data portal" ], "score": 90 }, "cer-postcode-installs": { "title": "Small-scale renewable energy installations by postcode", "publisher": "cer", "availability": "open", "summary": "Counts and capacity of rooftop solar and small-scale battery installations receiving certificates, broken down by postcode.", "url": "https://cer.gov.au/markets/reports-and-data/small-scale-installation-postcode-data", "format": "csv", "licence": "", "open_licence": true, "machine_readable": true, "api": false, "granularity": "Postcode, by month and technology", "update_frequency": "Monthly", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "", "cost": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "Clean Energy Regulator small-scale installation postcode data" ], "score": 90 }, "cer-safeguard-data": { "title": "Safeguard Mechanism baselines and emissions data", "publisher": "cer", "availability": "open", "summary": "Per-facility baselines, covered emissions, and units issued and surrendered for every facility covered by the Safeguard Mechanism.", "url": "https://cer.gov.au/markets/reports-and-data/safeguard-data", "format": "csv", "licence": "", "open_licence": true, "machine_readable": true, "api": false, "granularity": "Individual covered facility, annual", "update_frequency": "Annual", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "", "cost": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "Clean Energy Regulator, 2024-25 baselines and emissions data, published 15 April 2026", "National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007 (Cth)" ], "score": 90 }, "council-consultant-spend": { "title": "Council consultant and contractor expenditure, itemised", "publisher": "bcc", "availability": "unpublished", "summary": "Line-item detail of what councils pay consultants and contractors, by supplier and engagement.", "url": "", "format": "none", "licence": "", "open_licence": false, "machine_readable": false, "api": false, "granularity": "Not published at any granularity", "update_frequency": "", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "", "cost": "", "confidence": "estimate", "sources": [], "score": 0 }, "council-da-registers": { "title": "Council development application registers", "publisher": "bcc", "availability": "published", "summary": "Per-council online registers of development applications and their status.", "url": "", "format": "portal", "licence": "", "open_licence": false, "machine_readable": false, "api": false, "granularity": "Individual application, current status", "update_frequency": "Continuous", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "", "cost": "", "confidence": "estimate", "sources": [], "score": 49 }, "ctg-data": { "title": "Closing the Gap Information Repository", "publisher": "pc", "availability": "open", "summary": "Data and dashboard covering all 19 Closing the Gap socioeconomic targets, with progress assessments and supporting indicators.", "url": "https://www.pc.gov.au/closing-the-gap-data", "format": "csv", "licence": "", "open_licence": true, "machine_readable": true, "api": false, "granularity": "Target and indicator, by jurisdiction where available", "update_frequency": "Annual, with a dashboard maintained between releases", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "2026-09-03", "cost": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "Productivity Commission, Closing the Gap Annual Data Compilation Report, July 2026" ], "score": 90 }, "hgs-trends": { "title": "Home Guarantee Scheme Trends and Insights report", "publisher": "housingaustralia", "availability": "published", "summary": "Annual reporting on the government's deposit guarantee schemes: guarantees issued, borrower characteristics, debt-to-income ratios, and the portfolio's arrears, hardship and claims-paid figures.", "url": "https://www.housingaustralia.gov.au/trends-and-insights-reports", "format": "pdf", "licence": "", "open_licence": false, "machine_readable": false, "api": false, "granularity": "Scheme and state, annual", "update_frequency": "Annual", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "2026-09-03", "cost": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "Housing Australia, Home Guarantee Scheme Trends & Insights Report, sixth edition" ], "score": 49 }, "nashh-assurance": { "title": "NASHH Statements of Assurance and bilateral schedule reporting", "publisher": "treasury", "availability": "published", "summary": "Each jurisdiction's annual acquittal under the social housing and homelessness agreement: funding, detailed expenditure, program outputs, and measures against the National Outcomes Framework.", "url": "https://federalfinancialrelations.gov.au/agreements/nashh", "format": "pdf", "licence": "", "open_licence": false, "machine_readable": false, "api": false, "granularity": "Jurisdiction, annual; program-level within each statement", "update_frequency": "Annual", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "2026-09-03", "cost": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "Federal Financial Relations, NASHH 2024-25 Statements of Assurance (all eight jurisdictions, released August 2026)", "National Agreement on Social Housing and Homelessness" ], "score": 49 }, "nhsac-quarterly": { "title": "NHSAC quarterly housing supply reports", "publisher": "nhsac", "availability": "published", "summary": "Quarterly reporting against the 1.2 million homes target: national approvals, commencements, completions and construction costs, plus a per-jurisdiction expected completion date.", "url": "https://nhsac.gov.au/reports-and-submissions", "format": "html", "licence": "", "open_licence": false, "machine_readable": false, "api": false, "granularity": "National and state, quarterly", "update_frequency": "Quarterly", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "2026-09-03", "cost": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "National Housing Supply and Affordability Council, Quarterly Report - March 2026" ], "score": 49 }, "oaic-foi-stats": { "title": "FOI statistics by agency", "publisher": "oaic", "availability": "published", "summary": "Annual statistics on FOI requests received, granted, refused and reviewed across Commonwealth agencies.", "url": "https://www.oaic.gov.au", "format": "xlsx", "licence": "", "open_licence": false, "machine_readable": true, "api": false, "granularity": "Agency, annual", "update_frequency": "Annual", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "", "cost": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "OAIC annual reporting on the FOI Act" ], "score": 69 }, "transparency-portal": { "title": "Commonwealth entity annual reports", "publisher": "finance", "availability": "published", "summary": "Annual reports of Commonwealth entities, collected in one place.", "url": "https://www.transparency.gov.au", "format": "pdf", "licence": "", "open_licence": false, "machine_readable": false, "api": false, "granularity": "Whole-of-entity, annual", "update_frequency": "Annual", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "", "cost": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "Public Governance, Performance and Accountability Act 2013 (Cth)" ], "score": 49 }, "ucc-evaluation": { "title": "Medicare Urgent Care Clinics program evaluation", "publisher": "health", "availability": "published", "summary": "Independent evaluation of the Urgent Care Clinics program, reporting presentation volumes, patient and workforce findings, and cost per presentation.", "url": "https://www.health.gov.au/resources/publications/medicare-urgent-care-clinics-program-evaluation-second-interim-report", "format": "pdf", "licence": "", "open_licence": false, "machine_readable": false, "api": false, "granularity": "Program level, with some clinic-type breakdowns", "update_frequency": "Periodic interim reports", "last_updated": "", "last_checked": "2026-09-03", "cost": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "Evaluation of the Medicare Urgent Care Clinics: Interim Evaluation Reports 1 and 2" ], "score": 49 } }, "questions": { "aukus-payment-ledger": { "question": "How much has Australia paid the United States and United Kingdom under AUKUS so far, and when?", "answerability": "partial", "summary": "Defence publishes one annual total for the whole submarine program -- about $2.06 billion in 2024-25. What it does not publish is the split: how much went overseas, to which partner, on what dates.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "defence", "why_it_matters": "Payments to the United States and United Kingdom submarine industrial bases are\namong the largest single transfers the Commonwealth makes, they go to foreign\ngovernments, and several have been described as non-refundable. The threshold\nquestion is the simplest one available: how much has gone, to whom, and when.\n\nSomething real is published. Defence's annual report carries Program 2.16\nNuclear-Powered Submarines as a line in its supplementary tables, with budget\nagainst actual: total operating expenses of $2,056.3 million in 2024-25 against\na $2,257.8 million budget, almost all of it classified as suppliers, plus $208.1\nmillion of non-financial asset purchases. A reader can therefore establish what\nthe submarine program cost last year to within a rounding error.\n\nWhat that figure cannot do is separate a payment to the United States Navy's\nindustrial base from wages at Osborne, a contract with ASC, or a lease in\nCanberra. All of it is \"suppliers\". So the published number answers a question\nabout program cost while the question the public is asking -- how much left the\ncountry, and to which partner -- is not answerable from it at all.\n\nThe gap is a reporting split, not a missing record. Defence pays the invoices,\nso it necessarily knows which of that $2.06 billion went abroad and when.\n", "datasets": [], "blockers": [ "aggregated", "not_published", "fragmented" ], "workaround": "Defence's annual report supplementary tables give the program total, which is\nthe right starting point and is more than most reporting on this acknowledges.\n\nIndividual payments are announced by ministers, confirmed at Senate estimates,\nor disclosed by United States congressional sources, which have at times been\nthe clearest public record of what Australia has paid. Assembling those into a\nseries means guessing at currency, recipient, and whether a figure is a fresh\npayment or a restatement, then trying to reconcile the result against a program\ntotal that also contains domestic spending. The arithmetic does not close.\n", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "Department of Defence Annual Report 2024-25, Table B.1 (Program 2.16 Nuclear-Powered Submarines) and the administered schedules -- opened and searched 2026-09-01", "Australian Submarine Agency Annual Report 2024-25 -- opened and searched 2026-09-01", "Australian Submarine Agency Portfolio Budget Statements 2024-25 -- opened and searched 2026-09-01", "Final Budget Outcome 2024-25 -- opened and searched 2026-09-01" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": true }, "cis-strike-prices": { "question": "What has the Commonwealth agreed to pay under the Capacity Investment Scheme?", "answerability": "no", "summary": "DCCEEW publishes who won each tender, where, and at what capacity. It does not publish the agreed price, or any round-level statistic from which one could be inferred.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "energy", "why_it_matters": "The Capacity Investment Scheme underwrites revenue for wind, solar and storage\nprojects, which means the Commonwealth carries a contingent liability whose size\ndepends on prices nobody outside the scheme can see.\n\nThe disclosure that does happen is genuine and should be recorded as such. After\neach tender closes, the department publishes the successful projects, their\noperators, locations, technology and capacity, along with community and First\nNations benefit commitments. A reader can establish what is being built and by\nwhom.\n\nWhat is missing is the price. Not one figure has been published from which the\ncost of the underwriting can be estimated, and there is no round-level statistic\n-- a clearing price, a range, a distribution of bids -- of the kind the United\nKingdom's Contracts for Difference scheme releases after every allocation round\nand most European schemes release in some form.\n\nThe argument for disclosure is not only accountability. Bidders into a closed\nscheme have no benchmark, and the procurement literature associates that with\nhigher and more widely dispersed bids than a scheme where past clearing prices\nare known. If that holds here, secrecy is costing the Commonwealth money on the\ncontracts it is trying to keep cheap.\n", "datasets": [], "blockers": [ "not_published", "commercial" ], "workaround": "Tender outcome announcements give projects and capacity. Analysts estimate\nscheme costs from generation forecasts and wholesale price paths, which produces\na range wide enough to accommodate almost any policy conclusion.\n\nBudget papers carry provisions for the scheme in aggregate, not per round.\n", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "DCCEEW, Capacity Investment Scheme -- closed CIS tenders, checked 2026-09-01", "Capacity Investment Scheme Agreement, draft published December 2023" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "closing-the-gap-targets": { "question": "Which Closing the Gap targets are on track, and which are getting worse?", "answerability": "yes", "summary": "Answerable today from the Productivity Commission's Information Repository: 19 targets and over 160 supporting indicators, with progress assessed for 15 of them and the unassessable ones named.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "accountability", "why_it_matters": "Nineteen targets, over 160 supporting indicators, an independent custodian, and a\ndashboard maintained between annual releases. The July 2026 compilation reports\n1 target met, 3 showing good improvement and on track, 5 improving but not on\ntrack, 4 worsening, 2 showing no change from baseline, 3 with data available that\ncannot be assessed, and 1 with no data at all. Data exists for 18 of the 19;\nprogress is assessed for 15.\n\nThat last part is the tell. A report willing to say which of its own targets it\ncannot assess, and why, is reporting rather than presenting.\n\nThe four getting worse are adult imprisonment, children's early development,\nout-of-home care and suicide. They are named as worsening, in a government\npublication, without qualification.\n\nTwo structural features make that possible and are worth separating from the\nresult. The repository is maintained by the Productivity Commission rather than by\nthe departments delivering the programs, so the body reporting performance is not\nthe body being assessed. And the 2026 edition began incorporating\ncommunity-governed data, which changes who holds the pen rather than how the\nnumbers are presented.\n", "datasets": [ "ctg-data" ], "blockers": [], "workaround": "", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "Productivity Commission, Closing the Gap Annual Data Compilation Report, July 2026" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "consultant-savings-reconciliation": { "question": "Can the government's claimed savings on consultants be reconciled to its own contract data?", "answerability": "derived", "summary": "AusTender publishes the contracts and the Audit of Employment publishes an external labour series -- $6.0 billion and 21,970 FTE for 2023-24. What is not published is the bridge from either to the headline savings figure.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "spending", "why_it_matters": "Reducing spending on consultants, contractors and labour hire is a signature\ncommitment and multi-billion-dollar savings have been claimed against it. Two\nsubstantial datasets bear on whether the claim holds.\n[[austender-contracts|AusTender]] publishes contract-level detail, and the\nDepartment of Finance publishes the Audit of Employment, which reports the\nexternal labour workforce and total expenditure on consultants, contractors and\nlabour hire -- $6.0 billion and 21,970 full-time equivalent staff in 2023-24.\n\nWhat is missing is the join. Neither series is presented in a way that lets a\nreader reconstruct the savings figure: which procurement categories were counted,\nwhat the counterfactual baseline was, how roles converted to public service\nemployment are valued against the contracts they replaced, and how movement\nbetween the consultancy, contractor and labour hire categories is treated. The\nmethod that produced the headline number has been described in documents released\nunder freedom of information rather than published alongside the claim.\n\nThe result is that several different expenditure figures for the same years\ncirculate legitimately, Senate committees have repeatedly probed which of them\nthe savings are measured against, and the question stays open. A government\nconfident in the claim has the strongest interest in closing it, because the data\nneeded to check the arithmetic is already public and only the arithmetic is\nmissing.\n", "datasets": [], "blockers": [ "inconsistent", "fragmented" ], "workaround": "The Audit of Employment reports are the best available starting point and give a\nconsistent external labour series across years. AusTender can be aggregated by\ncategory to produce a spend series independently.\n\nEither will produce a number. Neither will produce the government's number, and\nwithout the definitions there is no way to tell whether the difference is\ndisagreement or double counting.\n", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "Department of Finance, Report on the 2023-24 Audit of Employment (published December 2025)", "AusTender contract notice reporting", "Parliamentary Budget Office costings on consultant, contractor and labour hire expenditure" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": true }, "contract-extensions-without-tender": { "question": "How often is a government contract extended or varied without going back to market?", "answerability": "derived", "summary": "Answerable with real data work. Amendments are published as data -- over 107,000 of them in the OCDS release -- but a contract history still has to be reconstructed from them.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "spending", "why_it_matters": "A contract awarded competitively at one value and quietly grown to many times\nthat value through variations has escaped the competition that justified it.\nThis is one of the recurring findings of audit offices, and one of the hardest\nthings for the public to check independently.\n", "datasets": [ "austender-contracts" ], "blockers": [ "format" ], "workaround": "Contract notices carry amendment records, so a determined analyst can rebuild\nthe history. It requires real data work rather than a lookup, which puts it out\nof reach of the journalists and councillors most likely to want it.\n", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "AusTender Contract Notice and Amendments Published Report, checked 2026-09-02", "data.gov.au, Historical Australian Government Contract Notice Data and the OCDS release" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": true }, "council-consultant-spend": { "question": "How much did my council pay each consultant last year?", "answerability": "no", "summary": "An aggregate figure usually appears in the annual report. Which firms, for what, and how much each, generally does not.", "jurisdiction": "brisbane", "topic": "spending", "why_it_matters": "Consultant spending is where a great deal of council money goes and where the\nleast scrutiny falls. A ratepayer can see that their council spent some millions\non consultants; they cannot see whether that was one firm or forty, whether the\nsame firm keeps winning work, or whether the reports were ever used.\n\nCouncillors are frequently in the same position. Several have told inquiries\nthey could not obtain the breakdown either, which makes this a question about\nwhether elected representatives can oversee their own administration -- not\nmerely a question about public curiosity.\n", "datasets": [ "bcc-annual-report", "council-consultant-spend" ], "blockers": [ "not_published", "aggregated", "format" ], "workaround": "The aggregate appears in the annual financial statements. Beyond that, the\npractical routes are a formal access application, or a councillor asking through\nthe chamber -- both of which produce an answer for one council, once, in a form\nnobody can compare with anywhere else.\n", "foi_route": "Formal access application under the applicable state regime. See [[rti-qld]] for Queensland.", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "Brisbane City Council Annual Report 2023-24, notes to the financial statements, opened and searched 2026-09-02" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": true }, "council-da-timeframes": { "question": "How long does each council actually take to decide a development application?", "answerability": "partial", "summary": "Answerable for New South Wales, which publishes a council league table, a performance dashboard and an API covering every DA lodged since 2019. Not answerable on a comparable basis anywhere else.", "jurisdiction": "", "topic": "planning", "why_it_matters": "Housing supply, construction cost and the cost of finance all turn on how long\napprovals take, and the national argument about it is conducted largely on\nanecdote.\n\nNew South Wales has fixed this for itself. Councils have been required to use the\nNSW Planning Portal since 1 July 2021, and the state publishes an interactive\ncouncil league table tracking time to lodge and determine applications by council,\nregion and development type, a Local Development Performance Monitoring dashboard\ncovering every council, and an Online DA Data API carrying applications lodged\nsince January 2019. Determination timeframes are also monitored against the\nStatement of Expectations Order 2024.\n\nSo the question is answerable, precisely and by anyone, for a third of the\ncountry. What does not exist is the national picture. Every other jurisdiction\nruns its own arrangements or none, and the definitions of lodgement, stop-the-\nclock periods and determination differ enough that the series cannot simply be\nconcatenated.\n\nThe remaining obstruction is therefore federation and definitions, not secrecy or\ncollection cost -- and NSW has demonstrated that the technical objections do not\nhold.\n", "datasets": [ "council-da-registers" ], "blockers": [ "fragmented", "inconsistent" ], "workaround": "For NSW, use the Planning Portal league table, the LDPM dashboard or the Online DA\nData API directly. Other states publish partial aggregate performance data of\nvarying scope; researchers have built one-off datasets by scraping council\nportals, which works until a portal changes.\n", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "NSW Planning Portal, council league table and ePlanning reporting, checked 2026-09-02", "NSW Planning Portal, Local Development Performance Monitoring dashboard", "data.nsw.gov.au, Online DA Data API" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": true }, "council-road-maintenance-backlog": { "question": "What is the maintenance backlog on my council's roads, and how is it changing?", "answerability": "partial", "summary": "Asset condition and renewal figures appear in annual financial statements in summary form; the underlying asset register generally does not.", "jurisdiction": "brisbane", "topic": "infrastructure", "why_it_matters": "Deferred maintenance is the easiest cost for any council to push into the\nfuture, because the consequence arrives after the current term. Ratepayers\nfunding a rate rise have a direct interest in whether the asset base is being\nmaintained or quietly consumed.\n\nCouncils do hold this: they must maintain asset registers with condition\nassessments to prepare their own financial statements. What is published is the\nsummary that accounting standards require, in categories that differ between\ncouncils.\n", "datasets": [ "bcc-annual-report" ], "blockers": [ "aggregated", "format", "inconsistent" ], "workaround": "", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "Brisbane City Council Annual Report 2023-24, infrastructure asset notes, opened and searched 2026-09-02" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": true }, "defence-project-schedule-cost": { "question": "Is each major Defence acquisition running to schedule?", "answerability": "partial", "summary": "The Major Projects Report still publishes project-level cost. Final Operational Capability dates are marked not for publication for 16 of 21 projects, and the Auditor-General has issued four successive Emphases of Matter about it.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "defence", "why_it_matters": "Defence acquisition is the largest discretionary capital program the\nCommonwealth runs, and the one with the longest history of schedule slip. The\nMajor Projects Report exists to let Parliament see, project by project, whether\nthat is still happening.\n\nOn cost it still does. The 2024-25 report carries per-project expenditure against\nbudget for 21 major projects, with variances explained -- an overspend of $227.1\nmillion on LAND907 Armoured Combat against a $504.0 million forecast, a 77.7 per\ncent underspend on LAND19 Phase 7B, and so on. That is real project-level\nreporting and the register should say so.\n\nOn schedule it has been hollowed out. Defence marks selected information \"not for\npublication\" following a security review, and in the 2024-25 report 19 of the 21\nprojects carry NFP material. Only three projects disclosed a Final Operational\nCapability date. Sixteen withheld it. Two others had no approved or defined FOC\nmilestone.\n\nThe consequence is stated by the Auditor-General rather than inferred. The\nreport records that NFP marking \"has significantly increased from 2021-22 to\n2024-25, reducing the ANAO's capacity to publish longitudinal analysis\", and that\nbecause key schedule information including FOC is not disclosed, \"analysis of the\nunderlying basis for individual schedule slippage is no longer able to be\nprovided\", leaving only aggregate, average and median values. The total slippage\nacross the 21 projects is 404 months. Which projects it belongs to is largely\nnot published.\n\nFour successive Emphases of Matter, from 2021-22 to 2024-25, have drawn attention\nto this in the Auditor-General's independent assurance reports. That is an\nauditor saying, four years running, that it can no longer tell Parliament what it\nused to be able to tell Parliament.\n", "datasets": [], "blockers": [ "not_published", "aggregated", "exempt" ], "workaround": "Read the Major Projects Report. Project Data Summary Sheets carry cost, scope\nand narrative per project, and Part 3 lists exactly which PDSS sections each\nproject has marked NFP -- so the report is transparent about the shape of its own\nopacity, which is more than most withholding regimes manage.\n\nAggregate and median slippage are published. Attributing slippage to particular\nprojects is possible only for the handful that disclosed FOC.\n", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "ANAO, 2024-25 Major Projects Report, Auditor-General Report No.16 2025-26 (paragraphs 2.11 to 2.16 and 4.18 to 4.23), opened and searched 2026-09-01", "Senate resolution requesting the ANAO reinstate the Defence Major Projects Report" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "federal-contracts-by-supplier": { "question": "Which companies receive the most federal government contract money?", "answerability": "yes", "summary": "Answerable today from AusTender contract notices.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "spending", "why_it_matters": "Included deliberately as a question with a good answer.\n\nA register that only records failures reads as a campaign and gets discounted\naccordingly. It is just as important to record where Australian government\ntransparency genuinely works, because those cases are the benchmark every gap\ngets measured against -- and because a body that publishes well deserves to have\nthat noticed.\n", "datasets": [ "austender-contracts" ], "blockers": [], "workaround": "", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "AusTender contract notice reporting" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "foi-refusal-grounds-by-agency": { "question": "Which agencies refuse the most FOI requests, and on what grounds?", "answerability": "yes", "summary": "Answerable today. The OAIC publishes agency-level returns quarterly and annually, as CSV back to 2011-12, with an interactive dashboard filterable by agency, outcome, response time and exemption.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "accountability", "why_it_matters": "FOI is the backstop for everything else in this register. When data is not\npublished, a formal request is the remaining route, and how well that route works\ndetermines whether any of the rest is theoretical.\n\nThis entry is included as one with a good answer. Agencies and ministers provide\nthe OAIC with quarterly and annual statistical returns on FOI activity, review\nnumbers and estimated costs. The returns are published as CSV from 2011-12\nonwards and in a summary spreadsheet, alongside a dashboard that lets a user\nfilter by portfolio or individual agency and by variables including decision\noutcome, response time and the exemptions applied.\n\nThat is a well-run statistical release: timely, disaggregated, machine-readable,\nand covering the awkward variables rather than only the flattering ones. It is\nthe reason the decline in full grants and the rise in refusals can be\nestablished at all, by anyone, without an FOI request about FOI.\n", "datasets": [ "oaic-foi-stats" ], "blockers": [], "workaround": "", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "OAIC, Australian Government freedom of information statistics -- dashboard and agency returns, checked 2026-09-01", "data.gov.au, Freedom of information statistics dataset (CSV, 2011-12 onwards)" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "haff-homes-delivered": { "question": "How many homes has the Housing Australia Future Fund actually finished, and where are they?", "answerability": "partial", "summary": "Housing Australia publishes financing decisions and contracted progress. Treasury reports the housing programs only in aggregate, and the completions figure -- 1,432 as at April 2026 -- reached the public through an audit. The ANAO has recommended publishing delivery against forecast.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "housing", "why_it_matters": "This is the largest housing commitment the Commonwealth has made in a\ngeneration, $10 billion against a target of 20,000 social and 20,000 affordable\nhomes, and the number that tests it is completions.\n\nSome reporting exists and the register should be accurate about it. The Housing\nAustralia Investment Mandate requires Housing Australia to publish detail within\nsix months of a financing decision, and it does; it also maintains a page\ndescribing overall progress on contracted dwellings. So a reader can establish\nwhat has been committed and, broadly, to whom.\n\nCompletions are a different matter. The Auditor-General found that Treasury\n\"publicly reports on the overall delivery of social and affordable housing\" but\nthat the reporting covers the Future Fund, the National Housing Accord Facility\nand the Social Housing Accelerator \"in aggregate\", and \"does not report\nseparately on the performance of the individual programs\". The figure that\nprompted most of the public argument -- 1,432 homes completed as at April 2026,\nagainst 40,000 -- appears in the audit, in a table the audit had to construct.\n\nThe data exists on a quarterly cycle. The ANAO's fifth recommendation asks\nTreasury to report publicly on program performance, and gives as candidate\nmeasures \"dwellings delivered versus forecast deliveries\" and information similar\nto the quarterly reporting Treasury already provides to government. Treasury\nagreed. So the internal series exists, the auditor has recommended publishing it,\nand the department has accepted the recommendation.\n", "datasets": [], "blockers": [ "aggregated", "not_published" ], "workaround": "Housing Australia's financing decision disclosures and its contracted-progress\npage give commitments. The ANAO performance audit is the practical source for a\ncompletions figure, and is a point-in-time document produced on the audit\noffice's schedule rather than the program's.\n\nState governments and providers announce individual projects, allowing a partial\nbottom-up reconstruction that is incomplete by construction.\n", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "ANAO, Department of the Treasury's Design and Delivery of the Housing Australia Future Fund and the National Housing Accord Facility, Auditor-General Report No.3 2026-27 (Table 2.3, paragraphs 3.125 to 3.130 and Recommendation 5), opened and searched 2026-09-01", "Housing Australia, funding round disclosures made under the Housing Australia Investment Mandate Direction 2018" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": true }, "home-guarantee-defaults": { "question": "How are borrowers under the government's deposit guarantee schemes faring, and what has the guarantee actually cost?", "answerability": "yes", "summary": "Answerable today. Arrears at 0.3% and hardship at 0.9% as at 30 June 2025, three claims paid since the scheme launched, and a chart tracking both against the cash rate.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "housing", "why_it_matters": "Guaranteeing low-deposit mortgages puts the Commonwealth behind the riskiest\nsegment of the housing market. The obvious question is how that risk has\nperformed, and the obvious temptation for the administering body is to report\nvolumes and stay quiet about losses.\n\nHousing Australia reports the risk in detail. As at 30 June 2025 loan arrears\nwere 0.3 per cent and 0.9 per cent of borrowers had accessed hardship support.\nTwo claims were paid in 2024-25, taking total claims paid since launch to three.\nFigure 15 plots hardship and arrears against every Reserve Bank cash rate decision\nfrom September 2022 to June 2025, and the text notes that arrears and hardship\nrun proportionally higher under the Family Home Guarantee, where serviceability\nrests on a single borrower with dependents.\n\nTwo details lift this above routine disclosure. The report identifies which of\nits own products carry the most stress rather than reporting a portfolio average.\nAnd it forecasts against itself: \"there may be a pickup in claims in 2025-26,\nconsistent with the natural lifecycle of the loan book\". Publishing a warning that\nyour own numbers are likely to worsen is rare.\n", "datasets": [ "hgs-trends" ], "blockers": [], "workaround": "Read the annual Trends and Insights report. Six consecutive editions exist, so a\nseries can be built, at the cost of transcribing six PDFs.\n", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "Housing Australia, Home Guarantee Scheme Trends & Insights Report 2024-25, downloaded and read 2026-09-03" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "housing-target-progress": { "question": "Is Australia on track to build 1.2 million homes by 2029?", "answerability": "yes", "summary": "Answerable today, quarterly, and per state. The Council publishes an expected Accord completion date for each jurisdiction, ranging from September 2029 to September 2033 against a June 2029 target.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "housing", "why_it_matters": "A government target with no independent measurement is a slogan. This one has\nmeasurement, published quarterly by an independent council, against a series the\ngovernment does not control.\n\nThe March 2026 report gives national movement since the Accord began -- approvals\nand commencements each up 17 per cent, 219,000 homes completed over five\nquarters, construction 0.9 per cent cheaper in real terms and 10 per cent faster\n-- and then does the harder thing. For every state and territory it publishes the\nshare of the Accord target approved and built to date, and an expected completion\ndate: September 2029 for Victoria and Western Australia, September 2030 for\nQueensland and South Australia, June 2031 for New South Wales, and September 2033\nfor Tasmania.\n\nAgainst a target of June 2029, that table says plainly that most of the country\nwill be late and one jurisdiction will be four years late. It is published as a\ntable on a public web page, sourced to ABS building activity and approvals data\nthe Council does not control.\n\nThe register records this as a win precisely because the news is bad. The common\nobjection to any transparency proposal is that no government will fund reporting\nthat embarrasses it. Here one did, quarterly, against its own signature housing\ncommitment.\n", "datasets": [ "nhsac-quarterly" ], "blockers": [], "workaround": "", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "National Housing Supply and Affordability Council, Quarterly Report - March 2026" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "lobbyist-register-coverage": { "question": "Who is lobbying the Commonwealth, other than the third-party lobbyists on the register?", "answerability": "no", "summary": "The Register of Lobbyists covers third-party lobbyists. In-house government relations staff -- the large majority of people who lobby -- are outside it and are not recorded anywhere.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "accountability", "why_it_matters": "The Australian Government Register of Lobbyists is real, searchable and\nmaintained, and it answers a narrow question well: which firms are retained to\nlobby on behalf of others, and for whom.\n\nIt was never designed to answer the broader one. A company, industry\nassociation, union or foreign entity that employs its own government relations\nstaff has no obligation to register them, and by common estimate that accounts\nfor the large majority of people who lobby the Commonwealth. The register\ntherefore describes a minority of the activity while carrying a name that\nimplies it describes all of it, which is arguably worse for public understanding\nthan having no register at all.\n\nThis is not a publishing failure and the register should not dress it up as one.\nNobody is withholding a list of in-house lobbyists. No such list exists, because\nno rule requires one to be kept.\n", "datasets": [], "blockers": [ "not_collected" ], "workaround": "The existing register covers third-party lobbyists. Beyond that, the practical\nroutes are parliamentary pass records, disclosed meeting requests obtained under\nfreedom of information, and annual reports of the organisations themselves --\neach partial, none comparable.\n", "foi_route": "No effective route. There is no held record to request.", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "Australian Government Register of Lobbyists and the Lobbying Code of Conduct" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "nacc-referral-outcomes": { "question": "Why does the NACC close the referrals it closes?", "answerability": "partial", "summary": "The annual report gives the statutory decision for every corruption issue dealt with, and states that about 90 per cent of referrals are excluded at triage as outside jurisdiction. The 204 no-further-action decisions remain a single undifferentiated figure.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "accountability", "why_it_matters": "The Commission publishes more than most observers credit it with. Its 2024-25\nannual report gives referrals received by type and year, referrals assessed,\nassessment timeliness against target, preliminary investigations closed by\noutcome, investigation status by year of commencement, outcomes of finalised\ninvestigations, and briefs referred to the Commonwealth Director of Public\nProsecutions.\n\nIt also answers the central question at the top level. Of the more than 4,700\nreferrals assessed since commencement, the Commissioner states that about 90 per\ncent were excluded at the triage stage because they did not raise a corruption\nissue within the Commission's jurisdiction, the jurisdiction being confined to\nserious and systemic corrupt conduct. And for the 244 corruption issues actually\ndealt with in 2024-25, the report gives the statutory decision for each: 13 NACC\ninvestigations, 6 joint investigations, 13 referred to an agency for\ninvestigation, 8 referred to an agency for consideration, and 204 no further\naction.\n\nThat last figure is where the reporting stops. Two hundred and four decisions\nthat a corruption issue within jurisdiction warranted no action are published as\none number, with no breakdown of why -- insufficient evidence, better handled\nelsewhere, remedied already, too minor to warrant the Commission's resources.\nThose are different findings about the integrity system and they are reported as\nthe same one.\n\nThis matters more than it normally would because the Commission has held no\npublic hearing since it began, on the view that the Act sets an\nexceptional-circumstances threshold. Where hearings are closed, aggregate\nreporting carries the weight, and the last bucket in the chain is the one that\ncarries none.\n", "datasets": [], "blockers": [ "aggregated" ], "workaround": "The annual report is the source and repays reading in full; the tables listed\nabove answer a good deal more than the Commission is usually credited with.\nParliamentary committee hearings occasionally draw out further detail on\nparticular classes of matter.\n\nNothing available breaks down the no-further-action decisions by reason.\n", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "National Anti-Corruption Commission Annual Report 2024-25 (Tables 2.6 to 2.30 and the Commissioner's review), opened and searched 2026-09-01", "National Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2022 (Cth), s 41" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": true }, "nashh-jurisdiction-reporting": { "question": "What did my state spend its share of the $9.3 billion social housing and homelessness agreement on, and what did it achieve?", "answerability": "yes", "summary": "Answerable today from the jurisdiction's annual Statement of Assurance, which carries funding, detailed expenditure, the matched-funding certification, program outputs and measures against the National Outcomes Framework.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "housing", "why_it_matters": "When the Commonwealth sends roughly $1.8 billion a year to the states for social\nhousing and homelessness, the questions that matter are whether it was spent on\nwhat it was meant for, whether the states matched the homelessness component they\nagreed to match, and whether anything improved.\n\nAll three are published, annually, for every jurisdiction. The New South Wales\n2024-25 statement reports Commonwealth specified homelessness funding of $539.6\nmillion, total expenditure on social housing and homelessness of $3,112.3\nmillion, and an explicit yes-or-no certification that the specified homelessness\nfunding was matched. It then reports program by program -- assertive outreach at\n$7.9 million against 422 people housed, 2,751 patrols and 4,752 engagements --\nand closes with a section structured as outcome, indicator and measure, giving\n156,417 social housing dwellings at 30 June 2025 against the prior year.\n\nThat is a serious acquittal document, and it is on a public website with its\nseven siblings.\n", "datasets": [ "nashh-assurance" ], "blockers": [], "workaround": "Read the statement for the jurisdiction and year you care about, on the Federal\nFinancial Relations website. The AIHW publishes national performance indicators\nagainst the agreement separately, which is the better route for a\ncross-jurisdiction view.\n\nBuilding a comparable series across all eight jurisdictions means transcribing\neight PDFs a year.\n", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "Federal Financial Relations, New South Wales 2024-25 NASHH Statement of Assurance, opened and read 2026-09-03", "Federal Financial Relations, NASHH agreement and bilateral schedules" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "pii-claims-register": { "question": "Which Senate orders for documents has the government refused, and on what public interest immunity ground?", "answerability": "partial", "summary": "The Senate publishes a consolidated list of every order, its compliance status and the public interest immunity grounds raised. It is a single long PDF, so any count or trend has to be extracted by hand.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "accountability", "why_it_matters": "Public interest immunity is the mechanism by which a government declines to give\nthe Senate documents it has ordered. Individually, each claim is a judgement\ncall. Collectively, the series is one of the few hard measures of executive\nopenness that does not depend on anyone's opinion.\n\nThe Senate does this job properly. Its consolidated list for the parliament\nrecords, for each order: the subject, who moved it, the date agreed, the date and\nnature of any response, the grounds of any public interest immunity claim set out\nas a list, and a compliance status drawn from a defined set -- complied with,\npartially complied with, no documents exist, not yet complied with -- each of\nwhich the document defines. Grounds appear in the form a reader can work with,\nfor example \"disclosure of privileged legal advice\" or \"prejudice to the\ninvestigation of a possible breach of the law\".\n\nThe gap left is narrow and worth naming anyway. It is one PDF, so establishing\nhow claims are trending, which portfolios account for them, or how compliance\ncompares across parliaments means extracting several hundred entries by hand.\nThat work currently gets done by advocacy organisations, which then lets the\nresulting picture be discounted as advocacy -- a poor outcome for a Senate whose\nown record is good.\n", "datasets": [], "blockers": [ "format" ], "workaround": "Read the Senate's consolidated orders for the production of documents list for\nthe parliament, which is kept current and carries everything described above.\nFor a series, transcribe it.\n\nThe Centre for Public Integrity periodically compiles and analyses the same\nmaterial, which is where most published comparisons across parliaments come\nfrom.\n", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "Senate, Orders for the production of documents -- 47th Parliament (consolidated list, last updated 4 May 2026), opened and searched 2026-09-01", "Senate Brief Guides to Senate Procedure No. 11 -- Orders for production of documents" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": true }, "production-tax-credit-recipients": { "question": "Who will receive the hydrogen and critical minerals production tax incentives, and how much each?", "answerability": "no", "summary": "Nothing to disclose yet -- payments begin in 2027-28. Recorded now because the reporting obligation is far easier to legislate before the first dollar moves than to retrofit afterwards.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "industry", "why_it_matters": "The hydrogen production tax incentive pays $2 per kilogram of renewable hydrogen\nfor up to ten years per project, from 2027-28 to 2039-40, alongside a parallel\nincentive for critical minerals processing. These are uncapped refundable\noffsets, which means the eventual cost is determined by how much industry\nproduces rather than by an appropriation someone votes on each year.\n\nThere is no gap to report today, and the register should say so rather than\nmanufacture one. Payments have not started. Nobody is concealing a recipient\nlist because there is no recipient list.\n\nThe entry exists because of the timing. Recipient-and-amount reporting was\ncontemplated during the bill's passage, and the legislation carries Community\nBenefit Principles that explicitly name tax transparency. Whether that becomes\nan actual annual publication -- who claimed, how much, for what production --\nis a decision available now, cheaply, before any commercial expectation of\nconfidentiality has formed around a payment that has already been made.\n\nRetrofitting disclosure onto a running subsidy is a much harder argument, and it\nis the argument this register keeps finding itself in everywhere else.\n", "datasets": [], "blockers": [ "not_collected" ], "workaround": "", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "Future Made in Australia (Production Tax Credits and Other Measures) Act", "ATO guidance on the Hydrogen Production Tax Incentive and Critical Minerals Production Tax Incentive, checked 2026-09-01" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "rooftop-solar-battery-uptake": { "question": "How many households in my postcode have installed rooftop solar or a home battery?", "answerability": "yes", "summary": "Answerable today, by postcode and by month, from Clean Energy Regulator small-scale installation data.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "energy", "why_it_matters": "This is the benchmark entry of the register, and it is included to be quoted back\nat every body that says delivery data cannot be released at fine geography.\n\nInstallation counts and capacity are published by postcode, by month, by\ntechnology, going back two decades. A resident can see uptake in their own suburb.\nA journalist can test whether a program is reaching outer suburbs or concentrating\nin wealthy ones. A researcher can build a time series without asking anyone's\npermission.\n\nNone of the usual objections survived contact with it. Privacy is managed by\naggregating to postcode. Commercial sensitivity did not prevent publication.\nNobody had to be persuaded that the public would misread the numbers.\n", "datasets": [ "cer-postcode-installs" ], "blockers": [], "workaround": "", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "Clean Energy Regulator small-scale installation postcode data" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "safeguard-facility-emissions": { "question": "How much did each Safeguard facility emit against its baseline, and how much did it offset instead of abating?", "answerability": "yes", "summary": "Answerable today from the Clean Energy Regulator's facility-level CSV, which carries baselines, covered emissions and units surrendered.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "environment", "why_it_matters": "The central criticism of the Safeguard Mechanism is that covered facilities buy\ntheir way to compliance rather than reducing emissions on site. Whether that is\ntrue is an empirical question, and the data to settle it is published.\n\nThe Clean Energy Regulator releases baselines and covered emissions for every\ncovered facility, the units surrendered, and the method under which surrendered\ncredits were created. Facilities surrendering 30 per cent or more of their\nbaseline must additionally file a statement explaining why more onsite abatement\nwas not undertaken, and those statements are published.\n\nThat last requirement is unusual and worth naming. It is a disclosure obligation\ndesigned specifically to expose the behaviour the scheme is accused of, imposed on\nthe parties doing it. Independent analysis finding that a large majority of\nsurrendered offsets came from criticised methods was possible because of it.\n", "datasets": [ "cer-safeguard-data" ], "blockers": [], "workaround": "", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "Clean Energy Regulator, 2024-25 Safeguard Mechanism baselines and emissions data" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "social-housing-accelerator-assurance": { "question": "Did the $2 billion Social Housing Accelerator buy homes that would not otherwise have been built?", "answerability": "partial", "summary": "Treasury publishes every state's six-monthly Statement of Assurance, with dwellings committed, commenced and completed and funding spent. They come as combined PDFs, so comparing jurisdictions or tracking a series means retyping them.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "housing", "why_it_matters": "When the Commonwealth gives money to the states for housing, the question that\ndecides whether the policy worked is additionality: did this produce dwellings\nthat would not otherwise exist, or did it substitute for spending a state was\ngoing to make anyway?\n\nThat question has an answering mechanism and the answers are public. Under the\nAccelerator, states and territories provide six-monthly Statements of Assurance\nfrom 2024 to 2028, signed off at deputy secretary level, and Treasury publishes\nthem. Each carries total dwellings committed, commenced and completed, people or\nhouseholds housed, funding committed but not spent, and funding spent, alongside\ncounting rules preventing a dwelling being reported twice at different stages.\n\nWhat stands between a reader and the answer is now only shape. The statements\narrive as combined PDFs, one file per reporting round with every jurisdiction\ninside it, so building the series any assessment of additionality requires means\ntranscribing tables out of documents released months apart.\n", "datasets": [], "blockers": [ "format", "stale" ], "workaround": "Read the combined Statement of Assurance PDFs on the Treasury website, one\nreporting round at a time, and transcribe. Treasury also publishes per-state\nImplementation Plans and periodic national completion counts, which give a\ncross-check on the totals.\n", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "Treasury, Social Housing Accelerator -- combined Statements of Assurance (August 2024 round), opened and searched 2026-09-01", "Treasury, Social Housing Accelerator program page" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": true }, "social-housing-vacancies": { "question": "How many social housing dwellings are vacant, and for how long, by area?", "answerability": "partial", "summary": "Average time to fill a vacant property is published for NSW and audited against target. Duration by small area is not.", "jurisdiction": "nsw", "topic": "housing", "why_it_matters": "Vacant social housing sitting empty while a waiting list grows is the kind of\nthing that should be visible to the public and to the agency alike. Duration is\nthe important variable: a dwelling empty for two weeks between tenancies is\nnormal operation, and one empty for two years is a policy failure.\n", "datasets": [], "blockers": [ "aggregated", "identifiable" ], "workaround": "", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "NSW Department of Communities and Justice, quarterly social housing delivery dashboard, checked 2026-09-02", "Audit Office of New South Wales, Social housing report" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "urgent-care-clinic-cost": { "question": "What does a Medicare Urgent Care Clinic visit cost the taxpayer?", "answerability": "yes", "summary": "Answerable today from the published evaluation: $236 per presentation in Commonwealth funding, against $617 for the equivalent emergency department presentation -- a saving of $381.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "health", "why_it_matters": "Unit cost is the number a program of this kind stands or falls on, and the number\na department has the strongest incentive to leave out of an evaluation.\n\nIt is in this one, and in more detail than a summary conveys. The second interim\nreport estimates Commonwealth funding at $236 per presentation across the 53\nTranche 1 clinics where a patient would otherwise have attended an emergency\ndepartment, against $617 for the equivalent emergency department presentation,\nleaving a saving of $381. It then publishes two different estimates of how many\npresentations were actually avoided -- about 260,000 on the program's own module\ndata, about 95,000 on a difference-in-differences analysis of hospital data --\nand carries both through to annual savings of $99 million and $36.2 million\nrespectively, the latter with a confidence interval of $25.4 to $48.1 million.\n\nPublishing a second method that produces roughly a third of the headline saving,\nand an appendix setting out how the unit cost was calculated, is the behaviour\nthis register is trying to identify.\n\nA reader can therefore form their own view of whether the program is worth its\ncost, which is the whole purpose of publishing an evaluation.\n", "datasets": [ "ucc-evaluation" ], "blockers": [], "workaround": "", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "verified", "sources": [ "Evaluation of the Medicare Urgent Care Clinics: Interim Evaluation Report 2 (2026)" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "where-does-waste-go": { "question": "Where does my council's kerbside recycling actually end up?", "answerability": "no", "summary": "Councils publish tonnages and name the sorting facility. What is not published is the proportion of collected material that is ultimately landfilled rather than reprocessed.", "jurisdiction": "brisbane", "topic": "environment", "why_it_matters": "Household recycling depends entirely on public willingness to sort waste, and\nthat willingness rests on an assumption the public cannot verify. Every reported\nfailure of the downstream chain damages participation for years, because there\nis no routine way for a resident to check the claim in either direction.\n\nCommercial confidentiality in the processing contracts is the usual reason\ngiven. That is a real interest, and it does not obviously extend to the\nproportion of collected material that is ultimately landfilled.\n", "datasets": [ "bcc-open-data" ], "blockers": [ "not_published", "commercial" ], "workaround": "", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "Brisbane City Council, recycling and resource recovery information, checked 2026-09-02" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false }, "who-met-which-minister": { "question": "Which lobbyists and organisations met which ministers, and about what?", "answerability": "no", "summary": "The lobbyist register records who is registered to lobby. It does not record meetings.", "jurisdiction": "au", "topic": "accountability", "why_it_matters": "Access is the currency of influence, and Australia records less about it than\nmany comparable jurisdictions. Registers of registered lobbyists answer a\ndifferent question from the one the public is asking, which is who actually got\nin the room.\n", "datasets": [], "blockers": [ "not_collected", "not_published" ], "workaround": "", "foi_route": "", "confidence": "reported", "sources": [ "Australian Government Register of Lobbyists and the Lobbying Code of Conduct, checked 2026-09-01", "State ministerial diary disclosure schemes (NSW, Queensland, Victoria)" ], "fixable_without_new_collection": false } } }